Business ethics, ideology, and the naturalistic fallacy by Goodpaster, Kenneth E.
Business Ethics, Ideology, and the 
Naturalistic Fallacy Kenneth E. Goodpaster 
ABSTRACT. This paper addresses the relationship 
between theoretical and applied ethics. It directs phi- 
losophical attention toward the concept of 'ideology', 
conceived as a bridge between high-level principles and 
decision-making practice. How are we to understand this 
bridge and how can we avoid the naturalistic fallacy 
while taking ideology seriously? 
It is then suggested that the challenge posed by ideol- 
ogy in the arena of organizational ethics is in many ways 
similar to the challenge posed by developmentalist ac- 
counts of moral 'stages' in the arena of individual ethics, 
namely, how to account for the normative force of 
frameworks that are theoretically derivative yet prac- 
tically essential. 
I have chosen as m y  main theme a classical 
p rob lem in phi losophical  ethics - the  naturalis- 
tic fallacy - because  I believe that  business 
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ethics, even though  it is a branch o f  appl ied 
ethics,  has at its core all o f  the richness that 
phi losophers  cou ld  possibly seek, if  only they  
w o u l d  look  and see. As a bonus ,  it also has all 
o f  the practical  impor tance  and urgency that  
phi losophers  so se ldom seek,  let alone find. 
To be more  precise, I should  say that  my  
theme  is the roots of  the  naturalistic fallacy, 
since in the end it is the  p rob lem o f  justifica- 
tion in ethics that  I want  to focus  on. The 
naturalistic fallacy is supposed  to be a malady  
that  afflicts certain kinds o f  arguments  in ethics. 
H u m e  is of ten  credi ted with having first 
ar t icula ted this ma lady  when he wro te  in 
exaspera ted  prose a b o u t  writers who:  
proceed for some time in the ordinary way of reason- 
ing and establish the being of a God, or make obser- 
vations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I 
am surpriz'd to find that instead of the usual copula- 
tions of propositions, /s, and /s not, I meet with no 
proposition that is not connected with an ought or 
an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, 
or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirma- 
tion, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and 
explain'd; and at the same time that a reason shou'd 
be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a deduction from 
others, which are entirely different from it. 
(Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I, p. 469) 
Hume ' s  concern  has occupied  moral  phi losophers  
for  centuries,  and never more  intensely than in 
the present  century .  And  this seems appropr ia te ,  
because  Hume ' s  concern  carries us to the center  
o f  normat ive  ethics by  inviting critical a t t en t ion  
to the nature  o f  moral  jus t i f ica t ion itself. In the 
field o f  appl ied ethics,  and specifically business 
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ethics, this concern becomes much more than a 
theoretical problem. 
voluntary on both sides. That corporation is behaving 
as if its ethics depended solely on laws and geography." 
There are, I suspect, few philosophers who have 
tried their hands at applied ethics without  in one 
way or another experiencing the following: 
First, I survey the business scene, looking at issues 
like corporate social responsibility, employee rights, 
international business practices and the like. The 
issues seem compelling and above all 'relevant'. 
People care about the answers to questions that get 
posed on such topics. 
Second, I turn to what I know best, the history of 
philosphical debate over the appropriate frameworks 
or principles for deriving duties, obligations, rights 
and virtues. I articulate these frameworks along with 
their inevitable and enduring pros and cons (utilitar- 
ianism, contractarianism, egoism, deontological plural 
isms of various sorts, and ethical relativism). 
Third, I ask myself, somewhat sheepishly, which 
(if any) of these frameworks or principles I (a) believe 
to be most justified, and (b) believe to be most rele- 
vant to resolving the issue at hand. Sometimes the 
order of these two is reversed. Sometimes (a) seems 
so difficult that I settle for an answer to (b) - any 
answer! 
Fourth, I begin to feel uncomfortable. There 
seems to be a persistent and nagging 'theoreticality' 
about these philosophical frameworks that poisons 
their practicality. They seem so distant from active, 
daily decision-making, especially the decision-making 
of corporations and other key institutional 'actors' on 
the human stage. They seem colorless and too general, 
like high-level major premisses in search not only of 
minor premisses but of whole substrata of minor 
arguments. The magnitude of the 'gap' between 
principle and practice seems overwhelming. Too 
many unknown facts are missing. Too many assump- 
tions have to be made before anything like prescrip- 
tion seems possible, let alone warranted. 
Fifth, and finally, I turn away from these frame- 
works and work backwards, seeking the ideological 
assumptions of the main institutional players them- 
selves, looking for strong and weak points in their 
lower-level normative patterns of justification. "This 
company seems to assume too much about private 
property in its environmental policies. That manager 
assumes that the employment relationship is fully 
If these reflections make contact with the reader's 
experience, as they do with mine, t h e n w e  are in 
a position to wonder  together about the nature 
of  moral justification in applied ethics, and 
specifically, about the role o f  what we might call 
the 'middle level normative patterns' that such 
justification often involves. 
A colleague of  mine, Professor George Cabot 
Lodge, calls these middle-level patterns 'ideol- 
ogies'. They are frameworks o f  ideas 
which a community uses to define values and to make 
them explicit. Ideology is the source of legitimacy of 
institutions, and the justification for the authority of 
those who manage them. Ideology can be convenient- 
ly seen as a bridge which a community uses to get 
from timeless, universal non-controversial notions 
such as survival, justice, economy, self-fulfillment and 
self-respect to the application of these notions in the 
real world. 
('The Connection Between Ethics and Ideology', ]our- 
hal of Business Ethics, May 1982.) 
The metaphors of  'middle level' and 'bridging' 
used above are significant in several respects. 
First, the implication is that ideologies are some- 
what more concrete and practical than the philo- 
sophical frameworks referred to earlier. Presum- 
ably this means that they are more readily avail- 
able for doing ethical 'work',  if  I may put it in 
such terms. They are more directly 'invokable'. 
To use an example based on Lodge's discussion, 
it is easier to understand an appeal to property 
rights or the limited state than to the greatest 
good of  the greatest number or the principle of  
universalizability. 
Second, and more intriguing, is the implica- 
tion that ideologies are somehow normative in 
character yet  historical at the same time. That is, 
they are not  'timeless' frameworks whose 
validity is always to be assumed. They have a 
kind of  'life of  their own'. They shift, drift, 
evolve, and develop. 
This fact about ideologies is intriguing because 
it puts philosophers a little off-balance. If a prin- 
ciple or a normative framework is to do its 
proper work, we are tempted  to think, it ought 
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to be properly stable. Yet ideologies do not 
appear to be stable. So how can they have nor- 
mative force? How can they truly just@ insti- 
tutional decision-making if they are themselves 
subject to the vicissitudes of change and evolu- 
tion? Are ideologies really bridges in the nor- 
mative realm - or are they better viewed as 
objects for investigation in descriptive ethics? 
And if the latter, then isn't their use in moral 
justification suspect? Aren't arguments based on 
appeals to ideology inevitably flawed by the 
naturalistic fallacy? Are the tenets of ideologies 
Humean oughts or Humean ises? 
We seem to be confronted with a dilemma. 
Either we commit the naturalistic fallacy by 
using (rather than descriptively mentioning) 
ideologies as frameworks for justification in 
applied ethics or we abjure such 'uncriticalness' 
and wallow in our issue-oriented space with the 
minimal normative resources of our high-level 
philosophical frameworks. Neither alternative 
seems appealing. The Scylla of conventionalism 
is flanked by the Charybdis of irrelevance. 
Now I realize I have overstated the case some- 
what on both horns of the dilemma. Obviously 
more can be said about the normative force of 
ideologies and much more can be said about the 
(direct) relevance of philosophical frameworks 
(e.g., can the structure of rule-utilitarianism be 
invoked here?). But even if all this were said, I 
am convinced that something like our dilemma 
would remain. For the fact is that moral justifi- 
cation relative to an ideological 'bridge' has a 
double aspect. From one point of view, it is no 
justification at all - it is at best what we might 
call 'rationalization'. While from another point 
of view, assuming that an ideology has some 
higher level warrant, it seems that the higher 
level warrant does all the work and that ideology 
is but a transfer agent, mere 'popularization'. 
In the time remaining to me, I want to argue 
that coming to terms philosophically with the 
phenomenon of ideology is among the most 
pressing challenges facing applied ethics, and 
especially business ethics, today. And I want 
further to suggest that the structure of this 
challenge is similar (on a macrocosmic level) 
to the structure of another challenge (on a 
microcosmic level), adding weight to some 
reflections that I have offered elsewhere about 
the 'projectability' of micro to macro levels in 
business ethics (see 'The Concept of Corporate 
Responsibility', Journal of Business Ethics, 
February 1983). Whether there are solutions 
to the problem and what they may be if there 
are, I will leave to the critical reader. 
II 
As to the importance to business ethics of a 
philosophical understanding of ideologies, there 
is perhaps no better evidence that the fact that 
so much of business behavior and corporate 
decision-making appear to be ideologically an- 
chored. In addition to the work of George 
Lodge, the works of Michael Novak, Robert 
Heilbroner, Christopher Stone, Thomas Petit, 
Michael Maccoby and others (all so very dif- 
ferent in background and discipline) make this 
abundantly clear. Whether one's perspective be 
that of politics, religion, law, economics, or 
psychology, the discovery is consistently that 
the power of certain normative patterns of 
reasoning over the decision-making of business 
executives is awesome. And it also seems to be 
true that the categories in which such patterns 
of reasoning are voiced seldom map neatly onto 
the standard categories of philosophical ethics. 
Interestingly, all of the writers just mentioned 
do more than describe the importance of these 
patterns or ideologies in decision-making. They 
also suggest a shift or evolution, a dynamic (vs. 
static) view of the patterns of moral justification 
used in business life. Roughly, the shift is away 
from what George Lodge calls 'individualism' or 
the 'Lockean' ideology to a less articulate but 
very real 'communitarian' ideology. The marks 
of these two ideologies according to Lodge are 
(in summary form) as follows: 
'THE LOCKEAN FIVE'  
1. individualism 
2. property rights 
3. competition -- con- 
sumer desire 
'THE NEW IDEOLOGY' 
1'. communitarianism 
2'. rights and duties 
of  membership 
3'. community need 
230 Kenneth E. Goodpaster 
4. limited state 4'. active, planning state 
5. scientific fragmentation 5'. holism - inter- 
dependence 
Lodge's conclusions? Sometimes they are dif- 
ficult to interpret. And this difficulty is neither 
peculiar to Lodge's work nor unpredictable 
philosophically. The temptation, obviously, is 
to treat the 'new' ideology as somehow nor- 
matively more acceptable as a justificatory 
framework for moral reasoning, so that not only 
does the transition (from old to new) represent 
a change, but a change for the better. Yet 
'ideological analysis' (by whatever name) is not 
supposed to be normative; it is supposed to be 
descriptive: "How can we preserve and protect 
some of  the most cherished attributes of  the old 
as we move inexorably toward the new?" (op. 
cir., p. 97). Heilbroner expresses similar senti- 
ments (see references below). 
This sounds like the shift from old to new is 
in some ways (a) unavoidable and (b) unfor- 
tunate. Hardly normative. The trouble is that in 
as many places, we hear a different message: 
"The old notions of  managerial authority rooted 
in property rights and contract no longer seem 
to be acceptable", and "the traditional ideology 
of  America, that of  Hardin's plainsman, has 
become inconsistent with the real world. . .  Cor- 
porate America has outgrown the ideology to 
which it and the communi ty  generally have 
traditionally looked for its legi t imacy. . ."  Final- 
ly: 
We are thus looking for legitimacy and authority to 
ideas which are increasingly inconsistent with prac- 
tice and reality. Theoretically, there are two possi- 
bilities: (1) returning to the old ideology, making 
practice and reality conform, or (2) recognizing 
explicitly the new ideology and making the best of 
it, aligning our behaviour with it, hopefully preserv- 
ing what is most valuable of the old. As a i~ractical 
matter, the first choice is impossible. We must do the 
second. Until we do so institutions will lack legitima- 
cy; the powerful will be drained of authority; the 
definition of values will be unclear and what many 
consider unethical behavior will abound. (pp. 86- 
87) 
The ambivalence that I hope I am not  reading 
in to this text, over the descriptive versus pre- 
scriptive force of ideology and ideological 
change is, philosophically, very important. It 
signals the Scylla and Charybdis problem men- 
tioned earlier, and ultimately an awareness of  
the problem of justification in applied ethics. 
And whether the categories be Lodge's 'New 
American Ideology', Novak's call for a new 
defense of  'democratic capitalism', Heilbroner's 
talk of  the decline of  'business civilization', 
Stone's remarks about the need for a shift in 
'corporate culture' ,  Petit's talk of  a 'moral crisis 
in management ' ,  or Maccoby's reflections on a 
new business 'psychostructure',  the underlying 
challenge remains: How can we achieve a phi- 
losophically clear understanding of  the norma- 
tive status or force of this middle-level phe- 
nomenon we are calling ideology? How can we 
use this 'bridge' concept without either losing 
its value or falling victim to its seductively falla- 
cious implications? I submit that this question 
should be high on the agenda of  business ethics 
in its current phase. 
III 
My concluding remarks will be methodological. 
I simply want to suggest that the problem 
or challenge I have outlined above bears strong 
resemblance to another cluster of  problems 
on a different level. Those who have read 
some of  my recent work on corporate respon- 
sibility will know that I emphasize the 
analogy between the individual person and the 
corporation in trying to shed light on business 
ethics. I have called this the 'principle of  moral 
projection',  and I have argued that it affords use- 
ful insights into both personal morality and 
organizational policy. If this principle makes any 
sense, however, we should expect not only that 
it will shed light from the level of  individuals to 
the level of  organizations. We should also expect 
that it will, as it were, 'shed darkness' as well. 
That is, we should expect that particularly diffi- 
cult issues on the one level will find their par- 
ticularly difficult analogues on the other. 
In our present context,  we should expect an 
individual or personal analogue to the problem 
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of moral justification and ideology that we have 
previously described on the level of institutional 
action-guidance. And so we do. 
In an article in Ethics ('Kohlbergian Theory: 
A Philosophical Counter-invitation', April 1982), 
I argued that it was important to remind our- 
selves of the limits of descriptive or explanatory 
'stage' theories of human moral development. 
Lawrence Kohlberg, as many are aware, is 
concerned to map the development of individ- 
uals along a series of stages and in a certain 
sequence, roughly from egoistic hedonism 
through rule-obedience to autonomous utilitarian 
or Kantian moral reasoning. 
It is not my purpose here to reiterate either 
my difficulties or my delight with this apparent- 
ly descriptive ethical (empirical) program, but I 
do want to underscore the similarities between 
this effort and the efforts at doing 'ideological 
analysis' that we have been discussing. And these 
similarities extend quite generally to other 
'developmentalist' or 'evolutionary' approaches 
to human character, whether careful and sys- 
tematic (like Kohlberg's) or sloppy and pop- 
market-oriented (the reader can supply some 
titles). 
It is tempting, as we have seen, to begin such 
accounts with an innocent and uncontroversial 
descriptive-explanatory purpose, and slowly, by 
degrees, because of an underlying and presup- 
posed approval in author and audience for 'later' 
over 'earlier' stages, to slip into normative claims 
where only descriptive claims have been warrant- 
ed. 
How and why does this happen? There are 
several explanations, but certainly among them 
is the nearly universal attitude that we share 
about the process of 'development' itself. 
Growth is good - who could be against it? 
Progress is good - who could oppose it? 
Evolutionary change is good - more power to it. 
'Stages' or 'phases' are almost automatically 
assumed to come with 'later is better' written 
into their inner logic. 
As soon as we point this out to ourselves, 
however, the challenge becomes apparent: the 
naturalistic fallacy pursues us. On the one hand 
we know that if we are headed for 'ought', there 
is no other path than via 'is'. Yet on the other 
hand, we know that the path must be walked 
with incredible care. Whatever else 20th century 
may have taught us, it has taught us that we can- 
not 'back into' or 'stumble into' oughts from 
ises, as if by magic or accident. 
Kohlberg, and his followers in developmental 
psychology (like some of those who do 
ideological analysis on the macro level?) do not 
always keep this caution in mind, even though 
such paper titles as 'How to Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It?' 
(Kohlberg in Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Develop- 
ment and Epistemology, Academic Press, New 
York, 1971) seem to suggest that they do. Too 
often, in my opinion, their work fails to be suf- 
ficiently critical at just the points where it 
becomes most practical, e.g., where later stages 
are recommended over earlier stages, where the 
'last' stage is defined, and where questions of 
clinical intervention are pursued. 
The key words are 'critical' and 'practical'. 
These words bring us to the very center of 
applied philosophy and applied ethics in par- 
ticular. Practicality demands that we keep our 
eyes and ears attentive to the actual middle-range 
frameworks of decision-makers themselves, that 
we allow ourselves to take 'ideology' seriously. 
Criticality demands with equal intensity that we 
not be carried offinto evolutionary inevitabilities 
or magical 'unfoldings' to the point where our 
own responsibilities to guide such change are 
overlooked. Determinism (whether of the 
happy or of the sad variety) is the enemy of 
honest normative inquiry. 
I suggest that the philosophical issues sur- 
rounding Kohlberg's work on the individual or 
micro level, via the principle of moral projec- 
tion, are analogous in many ways to the issues 
surrounding ideological analysis on the institu- 
tional or macro level - and that they are just 
as difficult, pointing as they do to a similar 
problem about the nature and normative force 
of middle-level, practical reason in the moral 
life. And I apologize, but not too abjectly, for 
leaving the problems with the reader rather than 
solving them. But the truth is that I am not sure 
I know how. 
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Postscript References 
As the field of  business ethics (and applied 
ethics generally) unfolds, new in many ways, it 
behooves us to recognize that certain tried and 
true philosophical investigations not only still 
apply, but apply with special importance. For in 
our enthusiasm over the new, we may be 
tempted to lose sight of  what was rich in the 
discipline of  the old. In our newfound concern 
for the moral dimensions of  both business life 
and the business system itself, both the internal 
and the external aspects of  business ethics, we 
might overlook the fact that business ethics is 
still a branch of  ethics and subject to certain 
caveats as a result. 
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